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1 Introduction
Economists usually analyse the political economy of reform in terms of con-
flicts of interest. They decompose the population in different groups, whose net
benefit from the reform differ, and then assume that these groups play some
political game —such as majority voting, Downsian competition, probabilistic
voting, agenda-setting games, etc — which determines the outcome of the re-
form.
Yet this approach only tells half the story. In most situations the reform
process is assocated with a debate, and the debate is about what the economic
effects of the reform are and how the mechanisms underlying those effects work.
People disagree not only because their net gains differ but also because they
have a different understanding of how the reform works. This aspect is typically
neglected in our analysis which assumes that all agents use a single, objective
∗This paper has been prepared for the Economic Journal lecture given at the Royal Eco-
nomic Society congress, University of Surrey, April 22 2009. I am grateful to John Vickers,
John Driffill, Jean-Pierre Florens, and participants to the AFSE meeting, the Namur work-
shop on political economy, and the Royal Economic Society meeting for helpful comments and
suggestions.
1
model —the correct model of the economy — to compute their gains and losses.
If these were true, there would not need to be a debate. But in real-world
situations the reform is heavily discussed because there is disagreement on how
it will work.
Examples include disagreements between Right and Left on the degree of
slack in an economy, the size of the Keynesian multiplier, the distortionary
effects of taxation and the location of the economy on a Laffer curve, the long-
run effects of the money stock on inflation, ot the ability of private contracting
to overcome externalities.
In a country such as France where trade unions and left-wing political parties
are still influenced by a Marxist tradition, the debate on unemployment and
labour market reform has involved arguments by the unions about whether
employment depends on labor costs at all, whether an increase in the minimum
wage stimulates the economy because it has a positive effect on consumption,
and whether the total level of hours worked is fixed so that only work sharing is
capable of creating jobs. This latter "lump-of-labor" fallacy was crucial in the
reduction in working time that was implemented in the mid-nineties. While no
economist, even in France, believes in the most naive version of the lump-of-
labor fallacy, the policy was supported by studies that used Keynesian models
where, in the short-run, total hours were determined by aggregate demand, so
that working time reduction indeed created jobs upon impact. The fact that
many economists put much faith in those models and had far more doubts
about how the long-run operates certainly played a role in the unexpectedly
high support for the policy among the French economics profession1.
That reforms partly rest on the outcome of such debates implies a special role
1See Saint-Paul (2004) for a discussion.
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for one particular class of agents: the intellectuals. These are usually absent
from our political economy models, because they assume agents are capable of
computing their true net gain by using the true model of the economy. Implicitly,
there is a role at best for a class of experts who would elicit that model for the
economic agents to use, as opposed to intellectuals who hold heterogeneous
views about the world. For this reason, many economists would argue that the
intellectual professions are just a veil and that their capacity to influence policy
is negligible if agents are truly rational.
Yet in practice a number of authors have pointed out the huge influence of
academic ideas on the general public’s perceptions and therefore on policy.
In La trahison des clercs (the betrayal of the intellectuals), Julien Benda
documents how the ethno-nationalist policies of the early twentieth century
were prepared by decades of indoctrination in universities. This should come as
a suprise to many contemporary academics who regard themselves as "citzens
of the world" , but the ethocentric academics of the nineteenth century were
probably as convinced as the contemporary ones of the correctness of their views.
Most notably, Hayek considered that intellectuals had played a crucial role
in the spreading and implementation of socialist ideas. Two aspects he empha-
sised were, first, the existence of a selection bias in occupational choice, and,
second, the insulation of intellectuals from reality. The first aspect originates
in the fact that the most talented pro-market people quite naturally elected
occupations in the business sector, while the most talented anti-market people
selected intellectual professions. The second aspect is the result of the fact that
by their occupation, intellectuals lack a first-hand experience of the market,
which makes them more likely to stick to abstract theories regardless of their
empirical relevance.
3
In "The intellectuals and socialism", Hayek wrote the following:
In every country that has moved toward socialism, the phase
of the development in which socialism becomes a determining influ-
ence on politics has been preceded for many years by a period during
which socialist ideals governed the thinking of the more active in-
tellectuals.(...) Experience suggests that, once this phase has been
reached, it is merely a question of time until the views now held by
the intellectuals become the governing force of politics.
(...) Though nobody will regret that education has ceased to
be a privilege of the propertied classes, the fact that the propertied
classes are no longer the best educated and the fact that the large
number of people who owe their position solely to their general edu-
cation do not possess that experience of the working of the economic
system which the administration of property gives, are important for
understanding the role of the intellectual. Professor Schumpeter (...)
has not unfairly stressed that it is the absence of direct responsibility
for practical affairs and the consequent absence of first-hand knowl-
edge of them which distinguishes the typical intellectual from other
people who also wield the power of the spoken and written word.
That is, one reason why intellectuals are prone to socialism is their insulation
from a real world experience of how markets work. Hayek then describes how
the selection bias operates:
(...)for the exceptionally able man who accepts the present order
of society, a multitude of other avenues to influence and power are
open, while to the disaffected and dissatisfied an intellectual career
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is the most promising path to both infl uence and the power to
contribute to the achievement of his ideals.
There is also, according to Hayek, a finer selection bias among the intellectual
professions themselves:
Even more than that: the more conservatively inclined man of
first class ability will in general choose intellectual work (and the
sacrifice in material reward which this choice usually entails) only
if he enjoys it for its own sake. He is in consequence more likely to
become an expert scholar rather than an intellectual in the specific
sense of the word; while to the more radically minded the intellectual
pursuit is more often than not a means rather than an end, a path
to exactly that kind of wide influence which the professional intel-
lectual exercises. It is therefore probably the fact, not that the more
intelligent people are generally socialists, but that a much higher
proportion of socialists among the best minds devote themselves to
those intellectual pursuits which in modern society give them a de-
cisive influence on public opinion
Finally, he argues in favour of the good faith of such socialist intellectuals:
It is neither selfish interests nor evil intentions but mostly honest
convictions and good intentions which determine the intellectuals’
views. In fact, it is necessary to recognise that on the whole the
typical intellectual is today more likely to be a socialist the more
he is guided by good will and intelligence, and that on the plane of
purely intellectual argument he will generally be able to make out a
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better case than the majority of his opponents within his class. If we
still think him wrong, we must recognise that it may be genuine error
which leads the wellmeaning and intelligent people who occupy those
key positions in our society to spread views which to us appear a
threat to our civilisation. Yet (...) the representatives of the existing
order (...) tend to regard the socialist intellectuals as nothing more
than a pernicious bunch of highbrow radicals(...)
In this lecture I propose a model where the intellectuals’ contribution build
an ideological bias in society’s learning process about the way the economy
works, which is detrimental to the view that the market economy works well.
Intellectuals are teachers who are in a privileged situation to influence the prior
beliefs of future generations, and they are perfectly sincere; they do not pursue
a pre-determined political agenda, and they are not motivated to elect their
career by any will to change the world2. Nor are their views influenced by any
self-serving bias that would rationalize their own economic interests under the
banner of the common good. Yet the characteristics of their profession — that
it is protected and in the pulic sector — generate a selection bias in the prior
beliefs of those who elect to become teachers. That is, one is more likely to
choose such a profession, the more unfavorable one’s opinion about the market
economy. This selection bias is different from the one pointed out by Hayek:
People with negative priors against capitalism choose the intellectual profession
not out of their own taste, but because they are more likely to rationally believe
that the returns from the protected intellectual profession are higher than those
from the exposed market activity. In fact, this logic applies to any civil service
2Related work on the interactions between learning and insitutions include Piketty (1995)
and Alesina and La Ferrara (2002).
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occupation — and casual evidence suggests that people in those occupations are
indeed more likely to hold socialist opinions. But the key point is that the
intellectual profession is itself protected and thus prone to that bias.
The model predicts that society will be more left-wing (and lower in learning
that the market economy works well, if that is the case),
(i) the greater the weight of the schooling system vs. the family in the
formation of beliefs, i.e. the lower the heritability of beliefs, and
(ii) the greater the correlation between one’s pessimism about the market
economy and the likelihood of becoming a teacher, i.e. the lower the social
entropy. In the context of this paper, social entropy refers to how predictable
is one’s occupation on the basis of one’s beliefs.
The existence of such a bias is consistent with casual evidence. Table 1
reports the voting behaviour of French teachers in the 2002 presidential election.
The third column gives the teachers’ intended vote from a poll published in the
magazine Le Monde de l’Education3 . The fourth column gives the result of the
candidate in the first round of the actual election. We see that the candidates
from the left and the extreme left got 72 % of the teachers’ vote, while these
candidates only had 43 % of the total popular vote4.
Does this bias have an actual consequence on people’s perception? If we
believe that French teachers are especially biased, and/or that the school system
has an especially high weight in France, then we would expect the French to be
particularly averse to the market economy. This is indeed what we observe, as
3The source for Table 1 is the Sofres polling institute, http://www.tns-
sofres.com/etudes/pol/280302_enseignants_r.htm
, for column 3, and Yahoo! News,
http://cgi.europe.yahoo.com/fr/profpoli/carte/president1f5.htm,
for column 4.
4Some minor candidates were not included in the poll. The 43 % figure includes the left-
wing minor candidates and therefore is larger than the sum of the vote for the left in column
4.
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can be seen in Table 2. Interestingly, if we compare France with the four other
major western European countries in the Table, France has greater expenditures
on public education as a fraction of GDP than the others.5
Finally, do negative beliefs about the market economy lead people to choose
a career in the protected sector? Here again I can only offer tentative evidence,
but a recent poll found that 70 % of French youth exiting high school would
prefer to work in the public sector6. Given that the French hold particulaly
negative views about markets, this is at least consistent with my argument.
But it could be explained by other phenomena, such as the existence of rents
for those who work in the public sector. Such rents are indeed documented.
The idea that beliefs and policies can mutually sustain each other has already
been proposed in other contexts. One may in particular mention Piketty (1995),
on which Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Bénabou and Ok (2001) have
elaborated. All these papers examine the link between beliefs in the prospects
of social mobility and demand for redistribution. While the policies considered
here are different (I focus on employment protection), the main contribution of
the present paper is to highlight the role of the intellectual class and how the
specificity of their economic situation affects the transmission of beliefs in the
rest of society.
I now turn to the setup of the model.
2 A model of beliefs and occupational choice
There are overlapping generations of people living two periods. The size of each
cohort is normalized to 1. In the first period of their life, people inherit their
prior beliefs from their parents and from the schooling system. At the end of
5According to the UNDP’s Human Development Report (2008), these fractions are France:
5.9 %, UK: 5.4 %, Italy: 4.7 %, Germany: 4.6 %, and Spain: 4.3 %.
6 : Source: http://www.ifop.com/europe/sondages/opinionf/jeunesfonctionpubl.asp
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that period, they make their occupational choices, electing between a career
in teaching, versus a competitive labor market. During the second period, they
work and produce children. Then they transmit their beliefs to their children.
The utility function is given by
V = E(w)− e,
where w is the wage, E the expectations operation, and e a disutility parameter
associated with being in a particular sector.
If people work in the market, they are paid their constant marginal produc-
tivity w¯. However, participation in the market is associated with labor market
risk. Each individual is exposed to such risk through k independent draws. For
each draw, with probability s, the worker is unsuccessful, i.e. unemployed, earn-
ing a zero wage. With probability 1 − s, the individual is employed and earns
w¯. We assume that the disutility of being in the market sector is the same for
all agents and normalize it to zero. This is without loss of generality as only
the difference between the two sectors matters.
Thus the (true) expected utility of the worker is
V = (1− s)w¯.
Labor market experience is uncorrelated across agents and across time.
Thus, the parameter that people learn is the probability of being employed,
and people learn it from their own experience. This assumption is clearly sub-
ject to the criticism that there are other ways of learning this probability than
through one’s own experience. People could learn the true value of s by pooling
information on their objective labor market trajectories, say through some sta-
tistical agency. But the model is essentially unchanged if instead s is interpreted
as any variable that affects the subjective utility from working in the market vs.
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the non-market activity. Clearly, many of these dimensions are difficult to mea-
sure objectively. Also, it has been pointed out by psychologists and behavioural
economists that people have greater confidence in their own experience than
in objective information, a form of cognitive dissonance called the "availability
bias".
People who work in the public sector earn a wage ω and experience no labor
market shock. Thus their utility is
V = ω − eT .
Upon making their occupational choice, workers have a prior belief on the
value of s. s can only take two values, sH and sL < sH . If s = sH we will
say that the market economy is ‘bad’, otherwise that it is ‘good’. Thus, the
prior belief is defined as the probability p that s = sH . At each date t there is
a distribution of p in the population, which reflects the different labor market
histories of their ancestors. We can represent that by a function pt(i), where
i ∈ [0, 1] indexes a particular individual in the generation that is working at t.
An exogenous total fraction n of the working cohort will become teachers.
This parameter captures the inverse of the productivity of the educational sys-
tem, relative to the rest of the economy. Their wages are financed by a uniform
lump-sum tax over the working population.
The disutility eM is drawn from an exogenous distribution with c.d.f. φ(.).
These shocks are uncorrelated between individuals, regardless of the generations
they belong to and regardless of their biological links — thus one cannot inherit
one’s parent taste for the teaching occupation.
A worker will prefer to be a teacher rather than work in the private sector
if and only if
eM < ∆(p, ω),
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where
∆(p, ω) = ω − [p(1− sH) + (1− p)(1− sL)]w¯ (1)
is the expected income difference between a public and a private worker.
Therefore, the proportion of workers who want to become teachers and have
a prior p is equal to φ(∆(p, ω)). This relationship can be aggregated to obtain
the ‘supply curve’ of teachers as a function of ω :
ST (ω, t) =
Z 1
0
φ(∆(pt(i), ω))di.
In equilibrium, the government adjusts the wage it offers to teachers in such
a way that exactly n people are willing to work in the profession; thus supply
equals demand:
ST (ω, t) = n. (2)
We parametrize G() in order to control the precision of the mapping from
beliefs to occupational choice as a varying parameter. Thus we assume the
following functional form:
φ(∆) =
e∆/σ
1 + e∆/σ
.
The parameter σ, which we call social entropy, tells us how predictable
one’s occupation is as a function of one’s prior beliefs. If it is low, then such
predictability is high: for ∆ not too different from zero φ(∆) will the be close
to zero or one. The distribuition of tastes for the teaching occupation is close
to a mass point and typically all workers with a sufficiently pessimistic belief
about the market economy will become teachers, while the others will work in
the private sector. By contrast, for σ large the distribution of tastes is smooth
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and the proportion of teachers among agents with certain beliefs is insensitive
to those beliefs.
We now describe the intergenerational transmission of beliefs. The priors of a
new generation are shaped by those of their teachers and their parents. Consider
a young individual. Call q his parent’s posterior probability that s = sH . Let
qT the random variable representing the posterior beliefs in the population of
teachers. Then the child’s prior p0 is such that:
ln
p0
1− p0 = θ ln
q
1− q + (1− θ)E(ln
qT
1− qT
). (3)
Thus it is (up to a logistic transformation, used for convenience) a linear com-
bination of the family’s and the teacher’s priors. The latter intervene through
an aggregate, which captures the idea that while the family is unique, people
are exposed to a variety of teachers throughout their upbringing; thus the con-
tribution of the school system is the same for all individuals7. We will refer to
θ, the weight of the family, as the heritability parameter.
Beliefs are updated in a Bayesian fashion on the basis of one’s labor market
experience. As teachers do not work on the private sector, they get no draw
and therefore do not update their prior. Therefore for any teacher with prior p,
his posterior is q = p. In the private sector, Bayes law implies that the posterior
of a worker with prior p who did not get a job is
p˜ =
sHp
psH + (1− p)sL
,
while if he did get a job the posterior is
p˜ =
(1− sH)p
p(1− sH) + p(1− sL)
.
7Alternatively, we could assume pupils are exposed to a finite number of teachers and
there would be some randomness in the contribution of the school system to prior beliefs.
This would merely complicate the analysis without affecting its essence.
12
This rule is applied for each of the k market draws that people are subjected
to. Using the convenient logistic transformation we see that the final posterior
q is determined by
ln
q
1− q = ln
p
1− p +Xk,
where Xk is the sum of k independent draws from a binomial distribution,
equal to ln sHsL > 0 with probability s and ln
1−sH
1−sL < 0 with probability 1 − s.
Note that E(Xk) = k(s ln sHsL + (1− s) ln
1−sH
1−sL ) = kz(s). Furthermore, z(sL) <
0 < z(sH). Consequently, if dynasties were left on their own with no interference
from the school system (θ = 1), priors would converge to the correct ones: in
expectations, the log odds ratio ln p1−p would fall by a constant negative amount
each period if s = sL and therefore p would converge to zero. Thus we have the
following benchmark result:
Proposition 1 — Assume θ = 1 and s = sL. Then for any ε > 0, limt→+∞ P (p >
ε) = 0.
Proof — This is a standard result, see e.g. Chamley (2000). Let us how-
ever provide a quick proof. Given the distribution of p, next generation’s pri-
ors p0 are equal to the preceding generation’s posterior q. Thus E ln p
0
1−p0 =
E ln p1−p + kz(sL), implying that at date t Et ln
p
1−p = E0+ tkz(sL). Therefore,
limE ln p1−p = −∞.
Next, since the draws of Xk are independent of the individuals’ initial p, we
have V ar(ln p
0
1−p0 ) = V ar(ln
p
1−p)+V ar(Xk). Thus at any date t V art(ln
p
1−p) =
V0 + tV ar(Xk). By Chebyshev’s inequality, for any α ∈ R P (ln p1−p > α) ≤
V0+tV ar(Xk)
(α−E0−tkz(sL))2 → 0. A change of variable gives the text’s statement.
Q.E.D.
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3 Do beliefs converge?
I now discuss the economy’s ability to learn the true parameter s when the
learning process is perturbated by the school system. In the rest of the discussion
I assume s = sL (the market economy is "good") , which is the case of interest
since the teacher bias then hampers learning.
In the model, the existence of the school system affects the formation of
beliefs through three main mechanisms, which I discuss in turn.
3.1 Mechanism #1: The self-selection effect
The most important mechanism is the bias generated by the self-selection of
relatively pessimistic people into the teaching profession. If, at the end of any
date t, the distribution of prior beliefs among the young generation is given by
a density ft(p), then beliefs among the teaching profession are distributed with
density ψt(p)ft(p), with
ψt(p) =
φ(∆(p, ωt))
n
.
Given that φ() is increasing, E ln pT1−pT > E ln
p
1−p ; since q = p for teachers,
this means that the school component in (3) contributes to an upward drift in
priors: people tend to become more pessimistic over time because children of
dynasties who had bad draws are more likely to elect the teaching profession.
Assuming the market economy is good (s = sL), can the influence of the
school system invalidate Proposition 1 and prevent the population from learning
the true value of s?8 Clearly, it depends on whether the contribution to learning
of the family’s market experience has a stronger effect than the teacher bias.
Intuitively, this is more likely to be the case, the greater the level of heritability θ,
and the smaller the teacher bias. The latter is larger, the smaller social entropy,
8 If the market economy is bad, teacher bias makes beliefs converge faster to the truth.
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since selection of teachers amongst the most pessimistic groups is stronger when
σ is low.
The following proposition validates this intuition. It tells us that convergence
still holds provided θ and σ are not too small.
PROPOSITION 2 — There exists a critical value of θ, θm(σ, k), such that:
(i) 0 ≤ θm(σ, k) < 1 and θm(σ, k) is decreasing in both σ and k unless
θm(σ, k) = 0.
(ii) If θ > θm(σ, k) then limt→+∞ P (p > ε) = 0.
(iii) For any k, ∃σ+(k), ∀σ > σ+(k), θm(σ, k) = 0.
Proof — See Appendix for details. The proof involves using Schwarz’s in-
equality to put an upper bound on the difference between the teacher’s average
beliefs and those of the rest of the population. One can then show that if θ, σ
and k are large ln p1−p goes to −∞ in expectations because that upper bound
is dominated by the contribution of the expected value of Xk in the "private"
part of the next generation’s belief. Finally, one uses Chebychev’s inequality to
get convergence in probability out of convergence in expectations.
Thus, if there is enough social entropy and if the weight of the family in the
transmission of beliefs is large enough, then the teacher bias does not prevent
society from eventually learning the true value of s if s = sL (of course learning
is facilitated by the teacher bias if s = sH).
On the other hand, can erroneous beliefs persist if entropy and heritability
are small? To answer this question I resort to numerical simulations. I simulate
an economy with 1000 agents, who start from random beliefs that are uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1—implying that the initial average belief is equal
to p = 0.5. At each date, a random disutility of teaching is drawn for each
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individual; then the equilibrium wage and the average value of ln qT1−qT . The
beliefs of the next generation are then computed and the model is iterated.
What do we find?
Figure 1 represents the evolution of the’ mean belief p along with its 2-
standard deviation band, for various values of σ and θ. In all those simulations,
the average p eventually falls with time: The teacher bias does not seem to
prevent society from learning the true value of the parameter s in the long run.
Thus, these simulations suggest convergence is more general than implied in
Proposition 2.
However, for low values of θ and σ, convergence is quite slow as the average
p can sharply increase as an outcome of the teacher bias. Thus, for σ = 0.05 and
θ = 0.1, after 100 periods the average p is still above 0.6. By contrast, in figures
1e, 1f, and 1g, convergence is almost complete after 100 periods, either because
a high social entropy generates a small teacher bias (Figure 1e), or because the
school system has a small weight in the transmission of belief (Figure 1f), or
both (Figure 1g). We also note that in the short run the standard deviation
is smaller, the larger the role of the school. This is not surprising, since the
teacher’s contribution to the beliefs is the same for all agents by assumption.
In the long-run, though, the labor market experience of people working in the
private sector is a powerful force for reducing the variance of beliefs, which is
almost zero after 100 periods in figure 1g despite the large weight of the family.
Figures 2 and 3 isolate the effect of the family and social entropy on the
speed of convergence.
In the extreme case where there is no social entropy, i.e. when the n teachers
are identical to the nmost pessimistic members of society, convergence no longer
holds. Instead, the mean belief converges to p = 1. This is easy to understand.
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At each generation, the n children of teachers inherit a mean odds ratio which
is exactly equal to that of the teachers. Consequently, the n most pessimistic
agents (the teachers of the next generation) will have an average odds ratio
which is even higher than that. Because teachers are insulated from market
draws, their children on average are equally pessimistic, so that the average
belief of teachers can only deteriorate (i.e. p goes up) over time. On average,
those who become teachers despite that their parents weren’t will earn a slot
in that profession only because they typically are even more pessimistic — their
dynasty got an abnormally bad sequence of draws. But as long as a dynasty
has joined the teaching profession, they get no draw at all; hence there is no
countervailng phenomenon.
We can indeed prove formally:
PROPOSITION 3 — Assume σ = 0. Then limt→+∞ P (p < 1− ε) = 0.
Proof — See Appendix. The idea is first to show that the most optimistic
teacher’s belief (defined as ln p1−p) follows an increasing sequence, due to the
insulation of teachers. Then one can show that it cannot converge to a finite
limit. Otherwise, the expected teacher belief would also have a finite limit, since
it contributes with weight 1− θ to the most optimistic teacher’s belief. But one
can always find a positive mass of "market" dynasties that have sufficiently
adverse shocks so as to eventually become teachers and increase their mean
belief by a first order amount, thus pushing it above any finite limit. Thus
ln p1−p must go to infinity for the teachers and this must also be true for the
rest of the population, by virtue of (3).
Figure 4 shows some simulations for σ = 0. Interestingly, while a higher
weight of the family slows convergence to p = 1 at the beginning of the learning
process, it eventually speeds it, albeit slightly. This is because a dynasty which
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has had a series of bad draws in the market — bad enough to make it more
pessimistic than the average teacher – is more pessimistic, the greater the
weight of the family; hence the contribution to the teacher bias of the member
of this dynasty who joins the teaching profession is larger.
3.2 Mechanism #2: The Insulation effect
The selection of teachers is the main determinant of the speed of learning, but
there are other ones. The second mechanism reinforces the selection effect; it
comes from the fact that the teachers do not get a draw from being confronted
with the market, which prevents their children from learning. Consider the
extreme case where social entropy is nil. Then in each generation, the n most
pessimistic people will become teachers. Their children’s priors, in turn, will be
(up to a monotonic transformation) a weighted average of the average prior of
the teachers and of their own parents’. Since their parents are also teachers, in
terms of priors the n children of the teachers are also the n most pessimistic
ones. If they were to become teachers, their beliefs would eventually converge to
the initial average of the n most pessimistic people, ruling out any convergence
of beliefs to the true value of s in the population at large (even in the case where
θ = 1 there would be a positive masse of teachers’ children who do not learn
the correct value of s). Whatever occupational mobility occurs when σ = 0
further aggravates this problem: Those who become teachers despite that their
parents were not must inherit a history of labor market experiences which is
so negative that they are more pessimistic than the marginal teacher; therefore
these individuals further contribute to making the teaching profession more
pessimistic—hence Proposition 3.
Thus the insulation effect slows convergence of learning, but for σ > 0 its
magnitude is small compared to the selection bias of beliefs. As an illustration,
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Figure 5 reports the evolution of the average belief p for σ = 0.1 and θ = 0.4, in
the standard model and in one version of the model where the insulation effect
has been neutralized by allowing teachers to get draws from the market in the
same fashion as workers in the private sector. We see that after 100 periods the
econmy without insulation has an average belief which is just 0.03 lower than
under insulation.
3.3 Mechanism #3: The social learning effect
The third mechanism that comes into play has little impact on the average belief
but affects the dispersion of beliefs. Ignoring biases, exposure to a teacher
smooths learning by indexing priors on the beliefs of more than one adult.
Since equation (3) is linear, this does not affect the speed of convergence as
measured by the evolution of E ln p
0
1−p0 . However, since the teacher’s contribution
is equal to the population average, the variance of beliefs is smaller, the smaller
θ. By Chebyshev’s inequality, we can then impose a stricter upper bound on
the fraction of people whose beliefs are more pessimistic than some cutoff value
p∗, the smaller θ. But this has very little impact on the evolution of average
beliefs and is dwarfed by the insulation effect. However it probably explains
why a marginally more pessimistic average belief sometimes arises as a result
of an increase in θ, although in addition to being quite small that effect is also
short-lived.
4 Economic determinants of the bias
The preceding discussion has emphasized the "sociological" determinants of the
bias, i.e. the weight of the family and social entropy. The model also predicts
that the bias has economic determinants. They come into play through the
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following mechanism: We have seen that the teacher bias comes from the fact
that the perceived gain from being a teacher, ∆, increases with p. Equation
(1) further reveals that the sensitivity of ∆ with respect to p depends on the
parameters of the economy, in particular sH , sL, and w¯. That is, a change in
the economic environment will, in expectation, affect the welfare of optimistic
people differently from that of pessimistic ones, and this will have an impact
on the degree to which pessimistic people are more represented in the teaching
profession. Another, more subtle effect, comes from the fact that the function
φ() is non linear. However, I will neglect that effect in the discussion below.
To analyze these issues, we can define the teacher bias at any point in time
as
Bt = EpTt −Ept (4)
=
Z 1
0
p
µ
1
n
φ(p, ω, λ)− 1
¶
ft(p)dp,
where for convenience φ() has been rewritten as a function of p, ω, and any
parameter of interest λ. A parameter change has a direct effect on Bt and
an indirect one through its induced shift in ω. The latter can be computed
differentiating (2):
dω = −
E(∂φ∂λ )
E( ∂φ∂ω )
dλ, (5)
where all expectation notations now refer to an integral weighted by ft().
Differentiating (4) and using (5) we get that
dB =
1
n
dλ
∙
E(p
∂φ
∂λ
)−E(p)E(∂φ
∂λ
)
¸
+
1
n
E
µ
∂φ
∂λ
¶"
E(p)−
E(p ∂φ∂ω )
E( ∂φ∂ω )
#
.
The first term in brackets will be positive (resp. negative) for any parameter
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shift such that ∂
2φ
∂λ∂p > 0 (resp. < 0). Since ∂φ/∂λ = φ
0(∆)∂∆/∂λ, this will
be true if ∂2∆/∂λ∂p > 0 as long as we neglect the effects from the nonlinearity
of φ(). This approximmation would also lead us to neglect the second term in
brackets, since ∂φ∂ω = φ
0(∆).
Thus we expect the bias to go up for any parameter shift such that ∂2∆/∂λ∂p >
0. In particular , we have that
∂2∆
∂w¯∂p
= sH − sL > 0.
A more productive economy will have more biased teachers. This is because
the more pessimistic people expect to be employed less often, therefore their
welfare increases by less, when wages in the market goes up, than for the opti-
mistic ones. The model consequently predicts a stronger teacher bias in more
affluent economies. This insight is confirmed by numerical simulations. Figure
6 reports one of them for θ = 0.2 and σ = 0.1, where we compare the evolution
of average beliefs for w¯ = 1 vs. w¯ = 1.2. In the latter case, people are more
pessimistic, due to stronger selection of teachers, by a moderate 0.03.
It is also of interest to study the effect of n, the number of teachers, on the
bias. Differentiation of (2) now yields
dn = E(
∂φ
∂ω
)dω.
Substituting this into the differentiation of (4) yields
dB =
dn
n
Ã
E(p ∂φ∂ω )
E( ∂φ∂ω )
− E(pφ)
E(φ)
!
.
If we again neglect the effect of the nonlinearity in φ, we have that dB/dn < 0
since φ0 > 0, which implies that E(pφ) > E(φ)E(p). When there are more
teachers, the bias is falling. This is intuitive since their recruitment has to be
more diversified.
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5 Political economy consequences
So far, we have discussed a pure learning process in a context where no actual
policy is taking place. In this section I provide an example where the beliefs
have an influence on policy, and where there is a reverse feedback effect of policy
on beliefs.
The story is simple: if people distrust the market economy they are likely
to support "rigid" policies that reduce exposure to the market. The kind of
policies that I have in mind are employment protection. By reducing the job
loss rate of insiders, employment protection reduces the number of jobs people
hold over their career, which in turn implies that they get fewer "draws" about
the working of the market economy. Formally, it means that k falls.
This reduced exposure will in turn provide people with fewer opportunities
to learn, thus slowing the convergence process for beliefs. In the presence of
teacher bias, this makes it more likely that pessimistic beliefs persist. Ana-
lytically, this means that the value of k is lower, so that the conditions for
convergence established in Proposition 2 are less likely to be satisfied. This in
turn reinforces the support for rigidity in the future. Thus a vicious circle arises
where, because people hold few jobs, their posteriors do not move sufficiently
quickly to compensate for the biases transmitted to the next generation by the
school system. That generation will then be overly pessimistic and support
policies that protect their jobs, implying they will also learn little from their
labor market experience.
How can this story be embodied into the model? I assume a simple voting
process every period. At the beginning of any period t, the adult population
who is allocated to the market sector gets its first draw. Consequently, a fraction
1 − s of them gets jobs and the remainder is unemployed. Immediately, after,
22
they vote on a labor market policy which allows them to trade job security for
wages. Building on Saint-Paul (1993, 2000), I assume that they face a trade-off
represented by a function w¯ = h(k), h0 > 0, which tells us that productivity and
therefore wages are higher, the more flexible the economy, i.e. the greater k.
Each draw contributes to a fraction 1/k of average income during the period.
Hence, the expected utility of an employed worker, conditional on s, is given by
Ue(s, k) =
1
k
h(k) +
µ
1− 1
k
¶
(1− s)h(k)
= h(k)
∙
1− sk − 1
k
¸
.
This expression reflects the fact that the worker already has a job and that a
reduction in k increases the relative weight of his current job — i.e. the expected
duration of that job — which reduces the fraction of time spent in unemployment.
Thus the employed are more in favor of employment protection than under a
veil of ignorance. In that case their expected utility would simply be h(k)(1−s),
and they would support the highest possible value of k.
The unemployed’s expected utility is equal to
Uu(s, k) =
µ
1− 1
k
¶
(1− s)h(k).
Clearly, they should support employment protection even less than under a
veil of ignorance. Note though that this increased right-wingness of the unem-
ployed as compared to the employed only relates to employment protection and
is only due to their current labor market situation. The model predicts that
bad draws makes people more skeptical about the market economy. Hence even
though the unemployed oppose employment protection, they are generally more
likely to subscribe to ideologies that reject the market economy.
As for teachers, they are clearly indifferent with respect to the value of k.
Consequently, I assume for simplicity that they do not vote.
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For an employed agent with belief p, expected utility is then simply equal to
Ve(k, p) = pUe(sH , k) + (1− p)Ue(sL, k)
= h(k)
∙
1− (psH + (1− p)sL)
k − 1
k
¸
. (6)
Clearly, ∂
2Ve
∂k∂p = −(h
0(k)k−1k +
h(k)
k2 )(sH−sL) < 0. Therefore, the employed’s
preferred value of k is a weakly decreasing function of p.9 This cross-derivative
property also implies that preferences are single-crossed. Therefore, we can
prove the following:
PROPOSITION 4 — Assume that at any date t there is majority voting
among the adult population on the value of k. Then there exists a majority
winner given by k∗ = argmax Ve(k, pD), where pD is the decisive voter’s belief
defined by
s+ (1− s)Ft(pD) = 1/2. (7)
If Ft is replaced by another distribution which dominates it in the first-order
sense, then pD goes up and k cannot fall.
PROOF — Consider a candidate deviation k0 > k∗. Let p ≥ pD. Then
Ve(p, k0) = Ve(pD, k0) +
Z p
pD
∂Ve
∂p
(q, k0)dq
= Ve(pD, k0) + Ve(p, k∗)− Ve(pD, k∗) +
Z p
pD
Z k0
k∗
∂2Ve
∂p∂k
(q,m)dqdm
≤ Ve(p, k∗),
since Ve(pD, k0) ≤ Ve(pD, k∗) and ∂
2Ve
∂p∂k (q,m) < 0. Thus, a fraction of at least
(1−s)(1−Ft(pD)) = 1/2 people prefer pD. A similar reasoning holds for k0 < k∗,
9This follows from a simple supermodularity argument and therefore is true despite that
k must be integer and thus does not satisfy first-order conditions. See Milgrom and Roberts
(1990).
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taking into account the fact that the fraction s of unemployed workers now
oppose the alternative, in addition to the employed such that p ≤ pD. Finally,
the second part of the proposition derives directly from (7). QED
The second part of Proposition 4 tells us that there is a sense in which
greater pessimism breeds more rigid institutions10 .
As a simple illustration, take the case where one can only elect between
k = 1, in which case the wage is h(1) = w1, and k = 2, in which case the wage
is h(2) = w2 > w1. By (6) an employed voter favors the more rigid institution
if and only if
w1 > w2
∙
1− psH + (1− p)sL
2
¸
.
This defines a critical value of p, p∗, such that all the employed more pes-
simistic than p∗ support rigidity. The latter formula gives
p∗ =
2(w2−w1w2 )− sL
sH − sL
.
For example, if employment protection reduces wages by 5% and the rigid
economy has a job loss rate of 5 % compared to 15 % in the flexible one, we get
p∗ = 0.5.
The effect of beliefs on the support for employment protection has some
interesting implications.
First, it tends to widen the gap between the speed of learning of a pes-
simistic society and that of an optimistic one, regardless of the cause of such a
discrepancy. We already know, for example, that for a given k a society with a
low θ is more pessimistic and learns more slowly (if s = sL) than if θ is high.
10However, our setting does not obviously imply that, say, a lower value of σ or θ increases
pessimism in the precise sense of first-order stochastic dominance. This is also true when
we want to analyze how the teacher bias at date t may foster future increases in rigidity.
Second, in general equilibrium the relevant distribution of beliefs for the vote depends on the
distribution of teachers, which itself depends on the expected market wage and therefore on
the expected outcome of the vote.
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This difference would be magnified if in addition the pessimistic society were to
choose rigid institutions, say k = 1, and the optimistic one chose flexible ones,
e.g. k = 2.
Second, it provides (to some extent) a mechanism for political hysteresis. By
this I refer to the fact that transitory aggregate shocks may have lasting effects
because they are associated with a change in institutions through their impact
on the size of their constituency. Here, if people hold more pessimistic beliefs
about s after a recession, they are more likely to support a low value of k, which
in turn will lead to lower productivity and a greater unemployment duration.
Of course, if people understand the transient nature of the recession, it is not
rational for them to alter their beliefs about s. But one can envisage a model
where changes in job security may result from either temporary aggregate shocks
or long-lasting structural shifts of s between sL and sH , and where these two
sources are not distinguishable by the agents. In such a case adverse transitory
shocks will indeed induce Bayesian learners to increase p.
Figure 7 illustrates this discussion by comparing two economies that have the
same structural parameters σ = 0.05 and θ = 0.2 but differ in their initial beliefs
(i.e. an initial uniform distribution around p = 0.4 vs. p = 0.5 with the same
spread equal to 0.8). The kinks in each curve indicate a political transition from
k = 1 to k = 2, which is associated by an acceleration of the learning process.
We see that the transition take place at a later date in the society which is
initially more pessimistic. Furthermore, the two societies’ beliefs diverge during
the period when their labor market institutions differ. In the long run, though,
the forces for convergence prevail and both economies end up with k = 2 and a
convergence toward p = 0.
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6 Conclusion
We have analysed a model where beliefs and institutions coevolve as a result
of individual families’ own market experience but also of the contribution of
a specific class of agents: "the intellectuals". While they do not pursue any
conscious ideological or political goal, and elect their profession on the basis of
a pure cost/benefit analysis, they nevertheless create a bias against the market
economy in the transmission of beliefs, because of the logic of their occupational
choice.
In the long run, the bias of intellectuals does not prevent society from learn-
ing the true parameters of the economy except in the special case of a zero
social entropy. This result could be overturned, though, if a proportion of each
new generations had a tendency to "forget", i.e. failed to inherit their par-
ents’ beliefs. Societies with different teacher bias would then converge toward
permanent differenced in beliefs instead of a mass point at the true parameter
values.
A central ingredient for my results is that the intellectual profession — the
"teachers" — work in a sector where, once they have entered, they are protected
from market forces. However, one should note that not all intellectual profes-
sions are in this situation; journalists, writers, artists (who also often intervene
in the policy debate) are typically in the exposed sector. Yet the same sort of
biases are often observed in those professions.
This shortcoming of the model is clearly a fertile avenue for further research.
One possibility is that for some of these professions (journalists), one has inher-
ited negative beliefs relative to average because the profession is more volatile
than the market.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2
In this proof and that of Proposition 3, x will be equal to ln(p/(1− p)) for a
parent, and x0 = ln(p0/(1− p0)) is the corresponding variable for his offspring.
Let ft(p) be the distribution of prior beliefs in the population for the genera-
tion born at date t. For any teacher represented by a subscript T, his posterior qT
is equal to his prior pT , which was drawn from the distribution of priors at date
t − 1, with density ψt−1()ft−1(). Therefore, calling x = ln(p/(1− p)),fˆt(x) the
distribution of x at t, and ψˆt(x) = ψt
³
ex
1+ex
´
the weighting function expressed
as a function of x, we have that
Et(ln
qT
1− qT
) = EtxT =
Z +∞
−∞
xψˆt−1(x)fˆt−1(x)dx.
Furthermore,
Et−1(ln
p
1− p) = Et−1x =
Z +∞
−∞
xfˆt−1(x)dx.
Hence,
EtxT −Et−1x =
Z +∞
−∞
x(ψˆt−1(x)− 1)fˆt−1(x)dx. (8)
= It−1
Since
R +∞
−∞ ψˆt−1(x)fˆt−1(x)dx = 1, this is also equal to
It−1 =
Z +∞
−∞
x(ψˆt−1(x)− 1)fˆt−1(x)dx−Et−1(x).
Z +∞
−∞
(ψˆt−1(x)− 1)fˆt−1(x)dx
=
Z +∞
−∞
(x−Et−1x)(ψˆt−1(x)− 1)fˆt−1(x)dx.
By Schwarz’s inequality, it follows that
It−1 ≤
∙Z +∞
−∞
(x−Et−1x)2fˆt−1(x)dx
¸1/2 ∙Z +∞
−∞
(ψˆt−1(x)− 1)2fˆt−1(x)dx
¸1/2
(9)
≤
p
V art−1(x).L,
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where L is any number such that
R +∞
−∞ (ψˆt−1(x)− 1)
2fˆt−1(x)dx ≤ L2.
Next, (3) implies that for the children of non teachers, we have
Ex0 = θ(ExNT + kz(sL)) + (1− θ)ExT ,
where ExNT is the expectation of x conditional on the parent not being a
teacher. For children of teachers, on the other hand,
Ex0 = ExT .
This latter formula reflects the fact that children of non teachers do not
inherit a random draw from their parent’s exposure to the market. Bringing
these two formulas together, we find that
Etx = θEt−1x+ θ(1− n)kz(sL) + (1− θ)ExT . (10)
Substituting (8) and (9) into (10), we can write
Etx ≤ Et−1(x) + (1− θ)
p
V art−1(x).L+ θ(1− n)kz(sL).
Furthermore, we can compute the variance of x by noting that x0 − Ex0 =
θ(x − Ex) + θ(Xk − kz(sL)) + θnkz(sL) for the children of non teachers and
x0−Ex0 = θ(x−Ex)− θ(1−n)kz(sL) for the children of teachers. We then get
V art(x) = θ2V art−1(x) + θ2W,
where
W = V ar(Xk) + n(1− n)(kz(sL))2.
Thus for any ε > 0 there exists t0 such that for all t > t0, V art−1(x) ≤
θ2
1−θ2W (1 + ε). Assume
L
r
(1− θ)
1 + θ
< −kz(sL)√
W
, (11)
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then we can find ε small enough such that the RHS exceeds the LHS by a
factor at least equal to 1+ ε. This in turn implies that (1− θ)
p
V art−1(x).L+
θkz(sL) < −η for t large enough and some η > 0, so that Etx < E0 − tη and
limt→+∞Etx = −∞.
The next step consists in showing that we can find an upper bound forR +∞
−∞ (ψˆt−1(x) − 1)
2fˆt−1(x)dx which does not vary with t. First, note that for
all p and t ∆min,t ≤ ∆(p, ωt) ≤ ∆max,t, with ∆min,t = ωt − (1 − sL)w¯ and
∆max,t = ωt − (1− sH)w¯. By monotonicity, it follows that for all x, ψmin,t−1 ≤
ψˆt−1(x) ≤ ψmax,t−1, with
ψmin,t−1 = φ(∆min,t−1)/n =
e(ωt−1−(1−sL)w¯)/σ
n(1 + e(ωt−1−(1−sL)w¯)/σ)
,
and similarly
ψmax,t−1 =
e(ωt−1−(1−sH)w¯)/σ
n(1 + e(ωt−1−(1−sH)w¯)/σ)
. (12)
Furthermore, since
R +∞
−∞ ψˆt−1(x)fˆt−1(x)dx = 1, it must be that ψmin,t−1 <
1 < ψmax,t−1. These inequalities are equivalent to
ωt−1−(1−sL)w¯
σ < − ln(1/n −
1) < ωt−1−(1−sH)w¯σ . Substituting the first one into (12), we get that
ψmax,t−1 <
e((sH−sL)w¯)/σ
1− n+ nee((sH−sL)w¯)/σ
= ψ∗max.
Similarly, using the second inequality, we get that
ψmin,t−1 >
1
n+ (1− n)ee((sH−sL)w¯)/σ
= ψ∗min.
One can readily check that for n < 1/2, ψ∗max− 1 > 1−ψ∗min. Therefore, ∀x,
(ψˆt−1(x) − 1)2 ≤ (ψ∗max − 1)
2
= H(σ). (A similar bound can be derived using
ψ∗min if n > 1/2). Therefore,Z +∞
−∞
(ψˆt−1(x)− 1)2fˆt−1(x)dx ≤ H(σ).
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Furthermore, we clearly have H 0(σ).
Thus we can just pick L =
p
H(σ) = ψ∗max− 1. Clearly, given σ (11) defines
a minimum value of θm(σ, k) for which it is satisfied, and as the LHS is equal
to 0 for θ = 1, θm(σ, k) < 1. Furthermore, since H 0 < 0, θ0m,1(σ) < 0 unless
θm(σ, k) = 0. Since limσ→+∞H(σ) = 0, θm(σ, k) = 0 for σ large enough.
Finally, putting together the fact that if (11) holds then limt→+∞Etx = −∞
and that the variance of x is bounded by θ
2
1−θ2W (1 + ε), we can again apply
Chebyshev’s inequality and prove that limt→+∞ P (p > ε) = 0. Finally since
V ar(Xk) = kV ar(X1),the RHS is increasing in k. Therefore, θ0m,2(σ) < 0 unless
θm(σ, k) = 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let xmt the most optimistic teacher’s prior at t. Observe that the ranking
of beliefs among the teachers’ offsprings is the same as among their parents and
that x0mt = θxmt+(1−θ)ExTt ≥ xmt. Therefore at least n people in generation
t+ 1 are such that x ≥ xmt. Consequently, xmt+1 ≥ xmt.
The sequence {xmt} is nondecreasing. Assume it has a finite limit x¯. For
any ε > 0, for t large enough we have x¯ − ε ≤ xmt ≤ x¯. Since xmt+1 ≥ x0mt, it
must be that x0mt = θxmt+(1−θ)ExTt ≤ x¯. Hence, ExTt ≤ x¯−θxmt1−θ ≤ x¯+
θε
1−θ .
Also note that since ExTt > xmt, x¯− ε < ExTt.
For any η > 0, let ht(η) be the mass of teachers at t such that x > x¯+η. Then
for t large enough, ExTt ≥ (1− htn )(x¯−ε)+
ht
n (x¯+η). Since also ExTt ≤ x¯+
θε
1−θ ,
it follows that ht(η) ≤ nε(1−θ)(ε+η) .
Note also that there exists A such that:
∃t0,∀t > t0, for any B < 1, P (xt > x¯−A) > B. (*)
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This property clearly holds for teachers, and it holds for the whole population if
it holds for non teachers. Let us prove it for non teachers. Take any ψ > 0 and
let A = ε− θ1−θkz
−+ψ. Then for xt > x¯−A, x0t > θ(x¯−A+Xk)+(1−θ)(x¯−ε) =
x¯−θA+θXk−(1−θ)ε ≥ x¯−θA+θkz−−(1−θ)ε = x¯−A+(1−θ)ψ > x¯−A. This
proves that if an individual’s prior exceeds x¯ − A, so will all his descendents’
priors. Furthermore, if xt < x¯ − A, x0T ≥ θ(xt + Xk) + (1 − θ)(x¯ − ε) ≥
θ(xt + kz−) + (1 − θ)(x¯ − A − θ1−θkz− + ψ) = θxt + (1 − θ)(x¯ − A+ ψ). This
process eventually exceeds x¯−A. Thus by taking t large enough, we can maintain
any fraction of the population at a level of x greater than x¯−A.
Finally, note that a proportion sk of non-teachers have Xk = kz+. For such
an offspring, x0t = θ(xt + kz+) + (1 − θ)ExTt ≥ θ(xt + kz+) + (1 − θ)(x¯ − ε).
Therefore, if xt > x¯ − At, then x0t > x¯ − θAt + θkz+ − (1 − θ)ε. Consider the
sequence defined by At = A and Au+1 = θAu+(1− θ)ε− θkz+ for u > t. Then
there is at least a mass (B − n)sk(u−t) individuals at u such that x > x¯ − Au.
Furthermore, we must have Au = θu−tα0+α1, where α0 = A+ θ1−θkz
+− ε > 0
et α1 = ε − θ1−θkz
+ < 0 (we can always pick ε small enough so that these
inequalities hold). For η < θ1−θkz
+ − ε, we have that Au < −η for
u− t >
ln
³
θ
1−θkz
+ − ε− η
´
− ln
³
θ
1−θkz
+ − ε+A
´
ln θ
. (13)
Therefore, in this zone, we have at least (B−n)sk(u−t) people such that x > x¯+η.
This means that hu(η) ≥ (B − n)sk(u−t). At the same time, we already know
that hu(η) ≤ nε(1−θ)(ε+η) . Noting that the lowest possible integer value of u − t
which satisfies (13) cannot exceed
ln( θ1−θ kz
+−ε−η)−ln( θ1−θ kz
+−ε+A)
ln θ + 1, we see
that the following inequality must necessarily hold:
ln(B−n)+k ln s.
⎡
⎣
ln
³
θ
1−θkz
+ − ε− η
´
− ln
³
θ
1−θkz
+ − ε+A
´
ln θ
+ 1
⎤
⎦ ≤ ln nε
(1− θ)(ε+ η) .
32
Clearly, we can have it violated by picking a low enough value of ε, which
allows us to have the RHS arbitrarily negative.
Thus the nondecreasing sequence xmt cannot have a finite limit, implying
limxmt = +∞. Consequently, limExTt = +∞, and the rest follows by applying
(3).
Q.E.D.
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Figure 4: The zero entropy case     
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Figure 5: the insulation effect    
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Candidate ideology % among
teachers
% in total
population
Arlette Laguiller Extreme
Left
8 5.7
-Olivier Extreme 2 4.2
Besancenot Left
- Robert Hue Extreme
Left
3 3.4
-Jean-Pierre
Chevènement
Left 16 5.3
- Lionel Jospin Left 29 16.2
- Noël Mamère Left 14 5.2
- François Bayrou Centre 3 6.8
Jacques Chirac Right 23 19 9- .
- Alain Madelin Right 2 3.9
- Charles pasqua Right 0 ‐‐
- Jean-Marie le
Pen
Extreme
Right
0 16.9
- Bruno Mégret Extreme 0 2.3
Right
Table 1 – French teachers’ voting in the 2002 presidential election
Table 2 – Beliefs about the working of free markets
